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Aircraft Checklist 
FORUM 
H W  FACTORS ISSUES OF THE AIRCRAFT CHECKLIST 
Patrick Ross 
INTRODUCTION 
Formal checklists have beensused in aircraft since before World War 11. As aircraft developed and became more and 
more complicated, the checklist became more important. Modern cockpits have become so complex that it would be 
impossible to operate such aircraft without checklists. 
Even though flight crews are trained in the use and importance of checklists, accidents still occur in which misuse 
of the checklist or poor checklist design are contributing factors. Proper checklist use and optimum checklist design 
are human factors issues. Degam and Wiener (1994) point out that until very recently, checklists have not undergone 
en~ugh scrutiny and analysis by the human factors profession. The premise of this paper is that flight safety can be 
enhanced by proper checklist usage and good checklist design. 
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
General 
Use and design of the aircraft checklist seems like a 
simple matter, however, there are many aspects to the 
checklist. Only recently have researchers begun to study 
the human factors issues associated with aircraft checklists. 
As of 199 1 there were 228 aircraft accidents in the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) records in which 
checklist misuse was a contributing factor (Sumwalt, 199 1). 
Additionally, there are numerous checklist related reports 
in NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
database. 
When one studies these accidentlincident reports, it 
becomes clear that when the checklist is not used in the 
proper manner, or there are design flaws in the checklist, 
there can be serious consequences. 
Sumwalt (1991) reminds us that there are good checklist 
techniques and bad checklist techniques. Sumwalt also 
categorizes checklist misuse into four categories. One, 
sometimes a crewmember, for various reasons, simply does 
not do the checklist. Two, the crewmember performs the 
checklist, but misses an item. Three, a crewmember 
responds that an item is checked or set, but the item really 
is not checked or set. Four, the checklist is started but is 
intermpted and not completed. 
Check List Objectives 
An aircraft checklist is a list used by the crew to make 
sure the aircraft is in the proper configuration for a given 
phase of flight. These phases of flight include takeoff, 
climb, cruise, descent, approach, and landing. 
The takeoff, approach, and landing pbases are of 
particular importance. They make up 27 percent of an 
average flight, but account for 76.3 percent of accidents 
(Degani and Wiener, 1990). 
The Challenge and Response checklist method is the 
routine most commonly used by the airlines. In this routine 
the designated pilot calls out a checklist item (switch or 
lever). This is the challenge. The pilot responsible for that 
item then responds by finding, grasping, and moving the 
item into the position called for. 
Degani and Wiener (1990) remind us that from the 
human factors perspective, the checklist provides an 
interface between man and machine. The authors go on to 
list several objectives of the a i r d  checklist as follows: 
1. Help the pilot accurately configure the aircraft for 
flight phase. 
2. Provide a systematic method to verifil 
configuration, even if the crew is fatigued. 
3. Provide a systematic and convenient eye scan of 
cockpit panels. 
4. Provide a sequential framework to meet cockpit 
operational requirements. 
5. Provide a method of crewmember cross checking. 
6. Provide a systematic method of configuring the 
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aimaft, keeping all m e m b e r s  in the loop. 
7. Provide a method of optimum crew coordination 
and distribution of cockpit workload. 
8. Provide a quality control tool that can be used to 
evaluate pilots. 
9. Promote a positive attitude about checklist use 
and safety. 
Reasons for Deviations from Check&ts 
Distractions. Distraction is the most obvious reason for 
deviations fkom the checklist. When emergency or 
abnormal situations arise, the checklist can be forgotten or 
interrupted. Since ch&klist initiation is usually tied to 
external cues, the checklist is sometimes forgotten when 
these cues are missing, or are different. 
In addition to distractions. Degani and Wiener (1994) 
discuss four factors why trained and standardized 
professional pilots deviate from standard operating 
procedures (SOP) and checklists. These factors are as 
follows: 
Individualism. No matter how well-trained pilots are, 
they are individuals and will impose that individuality on 
a pn>cedure or checklist. In some cases this individualism 
does not effect safety or may even enhance safety. 
However, in other cases, safety is compromised. The 
bottom line here is that there exists the possibility of 
conflict between individualism and standardization. An 
example where individuality and the flexibility of the 
human mind were useful was in the Siow City DC-10 
accident. In this case, the crew had to improvise an 
emergency procedure because it did not exist in the 
emergency checklist. 
Complacency. Many studies have shown that pilots can 
become complacent. This complacency is caused by the 
inherent error tolerance of the aviation system and the fact 
that most pilots in the day-to-day routine of flying face few 
emergencies or abnormal circumstances. This c o m p b c y  
or easing up can be made worse by fatigue. Lately, human 
factors researchers have noticed what they call automation 
complacency. This is a type of complacency in which the 
pilot becomes too trusting of the cockpit automation 
(Pamwmaq Molly, and Singh, 1991). 
Humor. Some pilots like to add variety and humor into 
the cockpit atmosphere. They do this because the cockpit 
atmosphere is inherently boring and humorless. To some 
extent, a little humor in the cockpit may be a good thing. 
however, it can cause problems. Degani and Wiener (1994) 
pint  out the case in which a pilot on the ground, 
requesting his clearance, asked for "federal aidn to St. 
Louis. "Federal aid" was substituted for FAA clearance as 
a joke. The controller thought the aircraft was being 
hijacked. The FBI and the police were called to the 
aircraft. In the associated ASRS report, the pilot 
emphasized that he would use absolute standard 
phraseology in the future. Other cases sighted by Degani 
and Wiener are pilots saying "gasoline" instead of "fuel" 
and "uno mas" instead of "one thousand feet" (more to 
level off). These non-standard callouts force pilots to make 
unnecessary interpretations during high risk operations. 
This, in turn, makes it difiicult to standardize cockpit 
procedure. 
Frustration. When a task or procedure is frustrating, 
pilots tend to find ways to work around it. Degani and 
Wiener (1994) note the example of the oxygen mask. 
Oxygen masks are uncomfortable and hard to replace in 
their holders. Regulations require that when one pilot 
leaves the cockpit above 25,000 feet, the remaining pilot 
must put on the oxygen mask. Since this task is frustrating 
to the pilots, some will abandon the standard climb 
procedure and ask for a level off at 25,000 feet until the 
other pilot returns to the cockpit. This non-standard 
procedure costs extra fuel and ties up the Air traffic Control 
(ATC) system. 
Design 
Even though there have been some accidents in 
which checklist readability may have been a contributing 
factor, research into checklist design( has begun only 
recently. Checklist design is interesting in that few people 
can agree on a standard. Even after aircraft manufacturers 
spend much time and money developing checklists, the 
airlines that buy the aircraft fresuently produce their own 
checklist changing everything fkom type style and paper 
color to actual procechve sequences. 
The researcher has personally witnessed checklist 
development meetings in which engineers, test pilots, 
training personnel, and Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) officials could not agree on issues such as paper 
size, decision tree format, and level of detail. Sometimes 
these meetings can even become emotionally charged due 
to strongly held opinions and beliefs. 
It is refkeshing that Degani of the NASA Ames 
Research Center has studied the problem of checklist 
design and has come up with some hard data. Using the 
data, Degani has developed guidelines for optimum 
checklist design. These guidelines wil l  be discussed later 
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EXAMPLES OF THE PROBLEM 
Detroit Accident 
In August of 1987 a Northwest Airlines MD-82 crashed 
just after breaking ground from Detroit Metro airport. The 
NTSB report showed that the flaps were not set for takeoff. 
When the aircraft broke ground, there was not enough lift 
to sustain flight and the aircraft crashed killing all but one. 
Normally, a mistake like this is caught when the crew 
performs the taxi checklist. In this case the crew did not 
perform the taxi checklist. 
From cockpit voice recorder transcripts, the NTSB 
concluded that the first officer was initiating the checklists 
even though Northwest SOPS spec@ that the captain 
should initiate them. Because the first officer became busy 
during a long taxi with a last minute runway change, he 
was distracted and did not initiate the taxi checklist. The 
NTSB concluded "the captain's passive involvement with 
checklist initiation did not provide a backup to the first 
officer's memory" (Sumwalt, 199 1). The NTSB went on to 
say that because the pilots were dishacted with the runway 
change, the aircraft ended up at a location on the airport 
where external cues and referem were not the same ones 
normally associated with initiation of a taxi checklist. 
New Orleans Accident 
In May of 1987, an Air New Orleans BAe-3 101 took off 
from New Orleans International Airport on a scheduled 
commuter flight. Just after takeoff, the aircraft experienced 
Severe yaw and engine power surges. An emergency 
landing was made straight head. The aircraft overran the 
runway, crossed a highway, and ended up crashing into 
several cars. The NTSB determined that the engine RPM 
leven were not in the proper position for takeoff and 
questioned the crew's checklist discipline (Degani, 1992). 
Although the NTSB cwM not prove that checklist type face 
size was a factor, they did note that the Air New Orleans 
checklist typeface was 57 percent smaller than that 
recommended by human engineering criteria. 
LaGuardia Accident 
In March of 1994, a Continental Airlines MD-82 was 
damaged when it ran off the end of the runway at 
LaGuardia Airport in New York. The airplane ended up 
beyond the runway on top of a tidal mud flat in Flushing 
Bay. Twenty-nine passengers ended up with minor injuries 
and $5.63 million worth of damage was done to the aircraft 
(Internet, 19%). 
The captain had rejected the takeoff because he noticed 
Aircraft Checklist 
the ampeed indication stop at 60 knots, jump to 80, then 
return to 60. The runway was somewhat icy. 
The crew had delayed starting the second engine during 
taxi out (against SOPS). Because of this, the crew hurried 
the takeoff preparations and missed several items on the 
checklist. The investigation that followed revealed that the 
crew missed one very important item, the pitotJstatic system 
heat. This heating system is used to keep ice off of the 
airspeed sensors. Because the system was -ally iced 
over, the airspeed readings were wrong. This caused the 
pilot to abort the takeoff. A contributing cause was the 
captain's failure to recognize the erroneous airspeed 
reading soon enough. 
Bryce, Uiah Accident 
In 1983, a Republic Airlines MD-82 was cruising at 
35,000 feet, 20 miles north of Bryce, Utah when both 
engines stopped. The crew did an emergency descent, 
performed the proper cheddist and turned on ail fuel boost 
pumps. At about 12,000 feet, the crew got both engines 
restarted and accomplished a successll diversion to Las 
Vegas. It turned out that the engines had stopped because 
both main fuel tanks on each wing were empty. The rest of 
the fuel was in the center tank, but could not get to the 
engines because the center tank fuel boost pumps had not 
been turned on per the climb checklist. The NTSB 
concluded that during the takeoff, one of the autopilot 
knobs came off, distracting both pilots enough so that the 
captain called for the CLIMB checklist out of nonnal order. 
When the captain did call for the climb checklist, the first 
officer received a radio call. The combination of the 
checklist being out of order, coupled with some minor 
distractions, caused the first officer to miss the center-tank- 
boost-pumps-on checklist item. 
SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM 
Checklist Uscge 
There are several techniques that can be used to insure 
that the checklists are used in the optimum manner. A 
checklist should be initiated only by the designated 
crewmember. This lessens the impact of distractions and 
reliance on another m e m b e r ' s  memory to self-initiate 
a checklist. If the designated initiator forgets, then the 
other m e m b e r  can say something like "are you ready 
for the checklist?" 
Checklists should be initiated during times of low 
workload, if possible. For example, Degani and Wiener 
(1991) state that the taxi checklist should be accomplished 
as close to the gate as possible and as far from the active 
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runway as possible. This is because the probability of 
completing the checklist becomes less and less as the 
aircraft gets closer and closer to the runway. 
Calling for the checklist should be done immediately 
following specific cues or events. For example, the After 
Takeoff checklist might be called for just after retracting 
the flaps or the Landing checklist might be called for just 
after lowering the landing gear. Caution must be used 
however, since in times of abnormal situations, the usual 
cues may not be available. 
Standard checklist nomenclature should always be used 
by both the challenger 'and the responder. Hand signals 
should never be used. Humorous phrases should be 
avoided, especially by the captam. Humomus phrases used 
by the captain could give the crew the impression that the 
checklist is not important. 
When a checklist is interrupted for any reason, the 
checklist should be stopped by the responding pilot. A 
good way to stop a checklist would be to say "stop it at flaps 
(or gear, etc)". This is referred to as an "explicit hold" on 
the checklist (Sumwalt, 1991). One simulator study of 
checklist interruption shows that explicit holds after an 
interruption can help a crew return to the checklist and 
complete it (Sumwalt, 1991). 
After a checklist has been completed, the challenging 
crewmember should announce that the checklist is 
complete. This emphasizes the end of the checklist so that 
the crew can move on to other cockpit duties 
Checklist Design 
In addition to the human factors issues associated with 
checklist usage, there are also human factors issues 
associated with checklist design. For example, if the print 
is too small, or the nomenclature is not standardized, a 
checklist loses it effectiveness. 
The checklist should not contain words that are 
ambiguous. Degani and Wiener (1990) inspected several 
checklists and noted usage of ambiguous terms such as set, 
check, and complete. Checklist nomenclature should 
always state the actual status or value of the item. For 
example, when calling out airspeed bugs, it is better to say 
"V1 121" instead of "V1 set." 
Checklists should use consistent, standardized 
nomenclature. When an airline has different types of 
aircraft (especially from different manufacturers) the 
nomenclature can he confusing One checklist may use the 
tenn throttles, and another may say power levers. 
Nomenclature can even vary between types of checklists. 
For example the normal checklist may say fire handles and 
the emergency checklist may say ENG FIRE handles. 
Degani (1992) points out that the two important factors 
that a checklist designer should consider are legibility of 
print and readability. A legible print is one that allows the 
reader to quickly and positively identify each individual 
character. Degani says that legibility depends on 
"character stroke width, form of characters, illumination on 
the page, and contrast between the characters and the 
background." 
Readability is a characteristic that allows the pilot to 
rapidly recognize single words, word-groups, abbreviations, 
and symbols. Degani says that readability depends on "the 
spacing of individual characters, spacing of words, spacing 
of lines, and the ratio of character area to background 
area." 
Legibility and readability are very important for 
checklists because cockpits have a variety of lighting 
conditions due to the changing sunlight situations, pilots 
must frequently shift their eye focus between near and far 
when reading charts and looking for tra&lc, distractions 
and abnormal situations frequently imermpt normal cockpit 
procedures, and pilots are of many different ages with 
varying seeing ability. 
Degani (1992) lists several criteria for the optimum 
design for checklists. The researcher will paraphrase some 
of the highlights of these criteria as follows: 
1. Fonts should be of the sans (without)-serif style. 
2. Fonts that have similar looking characters should 
not be used. 
3. Dot matrix type print should not be used. 
4. Long strings of text should be in lower case. 
5. When using upper case, the first letter of the 
word should be larger. 
6. Font height-to-width ratio should be about 5:3. 
7. The vertical spacing between lines should be at 
least 25-33 percent of the overall font size. 
8. The horizontal spacing between characters 
should be 25 percent of the overall size and at 
least one stroke width. 
9. Do not use long strings of words in italics. 
10. Do not use more than one or two typefhces for 
emphasis. 
11. Use black characters on a white or yellow 
background. 
12. Avoid black on dark red, green, or blue. 
13. Use anti-glare plastic to laminate documents. 
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14. Make sure that the print quality is excellent. 
15. When developing a checklist, the designer should 
determine what pilot age group will be using the 
checklist and then take a conservative approach 
in using information obtained from graphs and 
research data. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Aircrafl accidents have occurred in the past in which 
misuse of the checklist was a factor. These accidents may 
have been avoided if more emphasis had been placed on 
checklist use during initial and recurrent training. 
Checklists are an important a!&xt ofaviation's system of 
safety backups. They must be treated seriously. As aircraft 
become more and more technologically sophisticated, 
checklists become even more important. 
Deviations from checklists can be caused by distractions, 
individualism, complacency , humor, and frustration. One 
way to minimize the effects of the above factors is to 
remarly and methodologically use a standard checklist 
routine. 
The checklist should be initiated by the designated 
crewmember at specific times during the flight. The crew 
should keep in mind that abnormal situations can result in 
an absence of the usual checklist cues. 
Checklist design is a factor that should be considered by 
anyone developing a checklist. Type style, type size, paper 
color, and other characteristics can have an impact on 
usability. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Flight safety can be enhanced by proper checklist usage 
and good checklist design, if the following 
recommendations are followed. One, the importance of 
checklists should always be emphasized during crew 
training, especially during Cockpit Resource Management 
(CRM) training andLine Oriented Flight Training (LOFT). 
Two, during training, crews should be reminded of 
situations in which the checklist can be misused due to 
interruptions of abnormal situations, Three, funding 
should be provided so that researchers can continue 
evaluating checklist design. Four, airlines should attempt 
to standardize checklists as much as possible across various 
fleet aircraft types. Five, the Air Transport Association 
should sponsor a program in which the airlines get together 
and standardize checklist design. .) 
Patrick Ross earned an MBA from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and is currently a doctoral candidate at Pepperdine 
University in California. He is an aircraft operating manual editor with the Boeing Company and an adjunct instructor at 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. 
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